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LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARD TIME
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARD TIME
THE passage by Congress of the "Daylight Saving and Stand-
ard Time Act,"' while bringing about a most desirable condition
for efficiency, is likely to lead to some unfortunate legal entan-
glements until the various states adjust their time laws to co-
ordinate with the federal statute.
The powers possessed by the federal government are dele-
gated and are enumerated in the constitution. The constitution-
ality of this act rests on the power of Congresst to pass laws regu-
lating the commerce "among the several states."
That the provisions of this Act relate to intrastate common
carriers, to contracts made in conformity with state laws, to hours
for such state regulated events as elections, court sessions, writs
or process, and countless other matters in which time is a vital
factor, no one would have the hardihood to contend. Particu-
larly would this be true in states having statutory definitions of.
time as presently to be noted.
Most of the court holdings in states having no statutes on this
subject have been in favor of the use of local sun time rather than
standard time. A frequently quoted decision was given by the
supreme court of Georgia 2 as follows: A question raised was on
the hour of court action, it being 11:52 P. M., Saturday, by local
sun time but 12:20 A. M., Sunday, by standard time:
"Local custom cannot change Sunday into Saturday. To ex-
pect courts of justice, officers of the law and the public generally,
especially that large class of the population who do not live in cities
or at railroad stations, to go to the railroads for the time which is
to guide them in the performance of their duties under the law,
when they have in the heavens above them a certain standard by
which to ascertain or regulate the time, or to permit them at
will to follow two standards of time, would be highly impractica-
ble, and would be productive of great uncertainty and confusion
in the administration of the law. Thus the legality of elections
might be made to depend upon conflicting proof of local custom;
for what might be considered a legal election in one precinct might
be regarded as illegal in the next precinct, because of the time of
I Act of Congress Mar. 19, 1918. See Adv. Sheets 247 Fed. Rep. No. 7
t U. S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3.
2 Henderson v. Reynolds, (1889) 84 Georgia 159, 10 S. E. 734, 7
L. R. A. 327.
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opening or closing the polls; or the people of a precinct might
differ among themselves as to this. And so with regard to the
enforcement of the criminal law. The law requires the railroads
to cease running their freight trains by eight o'clock on Sunday
mornings. To allow the railroads to fix the standard of time
would be to allow them at pleasure to violate or defeat the law.
Even in cities where it is insisted the adoption of railroad time
has become general, the same difficulties might exist, for instance,
in the city of Augusta in this state which is at the dividing line of
two railroad standards, the railroads which enter the city from
the east having one standard of time, and the railroads which en-
ter from the west another standard, an hour different, both dif-
ferent considerably from the meridian or sun standard."
At the present time the only Georgia statute' bearing on the
subject would indicate that local time rather than standard time
would still hold. "A policy of life insurance runs from midday
of the date of the policy, and the time must be estimated accord-
ingly if the policy is limited to a specific number of years."
Local time is the only time recognized by the courts according
to the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law :4
"The only standard of time recognized by the courts is the
meridian of the sun, and an arbitrary standard set up by persons
in business will not be recognized."
In Nebraska' a summons was made returnable in justice court
at 10:00 o'clock. At that hour, standard time, defendant failed
to appear and judgment was given. Before 10:00 o'clock by the
local sun time defendant appeared. The court would not recog-
nize sun time. The circuit court held for local sun time. The
supreme court upheld the circuit court. "If standard time is in-
tended, the justice should so designate it in the summons. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that common
time was intended."
At the beginning of a session of court in Texas' the judge
set the courthouse clock and his watch by a sundial, about 36
minutes slower than standard time. A verdict in a murder case
was brought in before. Saturday midnight by the local time but
after the time for the legal expiration of the session of court ac-
cording to standard time. The court held for sun time and the
judgment was affirmed.
8 Code of 1910, Sec. 2501 (Sec. 2119).
4 Vol. 26, p. 10.
5 Searles v. Averhoff, (1890) 28 Nebraska 668. 44 N. W. 872.
"Parker v. The State, (1895) 35 Tex. Crim. App. 12, 29 S.W.
480. 790.
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At Creston, Iowa, a fire occurred at 12:02y, P. M., standard
time, or 11:442 A. M., local sun time. At "twelve o'clock at
noon" of that day the insurance policy on the burned building ex-
pired. The insurance company contended that standard time
was meant, it being universally used in the state. The insured
sued on the grounds that local sun time was meant. The court
T
decided that "as there is no statute requiring standard railroad
time to be used in determining the time of day referred to in con-
tracts, under a policy expiring at 12 o'clock at noon of a certain
day, the exact time of noon will be determined by the common, or
solar time, unless it is shown that a different time was intended."
Exactly the opposite was the holding in a Louisville. Kentucky,
case of fire insurance policies which expired at noon, April 1,
1902. At 11:45 A. M. of that day, standard time, a fire broke
out in the insured buildings. Central Standard time is based upon
the ninetieth meridian but Louisville, being 40 22Y' east of that
meridian, the sun had crossed the local meridian and it was
'12:02Y2 o'clock P. M. by local sun time. The insurance com-
panies claimed that local time was meant in the policies and hence
they had expired. The court," however, held for standard time
and the insurance company had to pay. In the Iowa case the
sun was "coming" to Creston at the time of the fire and hence be-
fore noon and the insurance company had to pay. In Louisville
the sun was "going" and by the same token (and by every supreme
court decision on the subject up to that time save one) the com-
pany should have been exempt from payment. Insurance com-
panies, however, usually "get it both coming and going" and this
was no exception to the rule.
The only supreme court decision of which the writer is aware
in which the custom of using standard time was upheld prior to
1905 was in State v. Johnson." Defendant was found guilty of
keeping a saloon open after 11:00 P. M., the hour prescribed by
statute for closing. The saloon closed at 11:20, standard time, but
10:54, local time. The court held for standard time. "The stan-
dard time adopted by the railroads in 1883 were soon adopted
Jones v. German Insuran-ce Co., (1899) 110 Icwa 75, 81 N. W. 188,
46 L. R. A. 860.
s Rochester German Insurance Co. v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., (June
15, 1905) 120 Ky. 752, 87 S. W. 1115, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1155, 1 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 364.
1) State v. Johnson, (1898) 74 Minn. 381, 77 N. V. 293.
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by the people-in some parts of the country sooner than others
-and have long since become the sole standards of time through-
out the United States. Cent. Dict. tit. 'Time.' In Minnesota,
Central time was promptly adopted, and long before 1889 was in
general use, and established as the sole standard of time in both
public and private business. No other is ever used or referred
to." A similar decision was made in North Dakota1" in the case
of a mortgage foreclosure which took place at "2:00 o'clock P.M."
The court took judicial notice that "standard" time in designating
the hour of the day has been the universal usage in this state since
territorial times.
One of the earliest of court decisions on this question was
given in England in 1858. It was held that the time appointed
for the sitting of a court must be understood as the mean solar
time of the place where the court is held and not Greenwich time,
unless it be so expressed, and a new trial was granted to a de-
fendant who had arrived at the local time appointed by the court
but found the court had met by Greenwich time and the case had
been decided against him.
The parliament of the United Kingdom was the first to adopt
a legal standard of time.
"A Bill to remove doubts as to the meaning of expressions
relative to time occurring in acts of Parliament, deeds, and other
legal instruments.
"Whereas it is expedient to remove certain doubts as to
whether expressions of time occurring in acts of Parliament,
deeds, and other legal instruments relate in England and Scotland
to Greenwich time, and in Ireland to Dublin time, or to the mean
astronomical time in each locality:
, "Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Maj-
esty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords, spiritual
and temporal, and Commons, in the present Parliament assembled,
and by the authority of the same, as follows (that is to say) : *
"1. That whenever any expression of time occurs in any
act of Parliament, deed, or other legal instrument, the time re--
ferred to shall, unless it is otherwise specifically stated, be held in
the case of Great Britain to be Greenwich mean time and in the
case of Ireland, Dublin mean time.
"2. This act may be cited as the statutes (definition of time)
act, 1880."
Seventy-fifth meridian time was legalized in the District of
Columbia by the following act of Congress:
10 Orvik and Olson v. John Casselman, (1905) 15 N.D. 34, 77 N.W.
1105.
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"An Act to establish a standard of time in the District of Col-
umbia.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
legal standard of time in the District of Columbia shall hereafter
be the mean time of the seventy-fifth meridian of longtitude west
of Greenwich.
"Section 2. That this act shall not be so construed as to affect
existing contracts.
"Approved, March 13, 1884."
March 12, 1903, standard time was adopted in Germany by
an imperial decree as follows:
"We, Wilhelm, by the grace of God, German Emperor, King
of Prussia, decree in the name of the Empire, the Bundesrath and
Reichstag concurring as follows:
"The legal time in Germany is the mean solar time of longi-
tude 15o east from Greenwich."
An interesting standard time regulation exists in Portugal.
The time is based upon the Meridian of Lisbon. Clocks on rail-
way station platforms and those regulating the running of trains
are required to be five minutes slow.
STATE STATUTES.
A number of states have statutes providing for standard time.
The following are examples:
Minnesota: "The mean solar time of ninety degrees longi-
tude west from Greenwich, being commonly called 'central time,'
shall be the standard time for all purposes."' 1
New Jersey: "That the standard' time of the state of New
Jersey shall be the time of the seventy-fifth meridian west from
Greenwich, and that the time named in any of the statutes of
this~state and in public proclamations, in the rules and orders of
the senate and general assembly, in the decrees and orders of the
courts and in all notices and advertisements in any legal proceed-
ings, shall be deemed and taken to be the standard time afore-
said.""
Marylaizd. "The standard time throughout the state shall be
that of the seventy-fifth meridian of longtitude west from Green-
wich, by which all courts, banking institutions and public offices
and all legal or official proceedings shall be regulated.""
"1 Minn. G. S. 1913, Sec. 9412 (20).
12 Gen. Stat. (1884), Vol. 3, p. 3132.
13 Pub. Gen. Laws (1888), Vol. 2, p. 2068.
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Michigan: "The people of the State of Michigan enact, That
standard time, central division, based on the ninetieth meridian
of longitude west from Greenwich, shall be legal time within this
state."1
CHANGES NEEDED.
It should be apparent from the foregoing that states having
standard time laws should as speedily as possible modify them to
meet the federal requirements and those having no statutes should
pass adequate laws on the subject. One problem that should not
be overlooked is some automatic adjustment for the shifting hours
as provided by Congress. It is unfortunate that "legislation by
reference" cannot be adopted by a state'5' or a state cannot waive
its rights to regulate the matter of time save through constitu-
tional amendment.
In an appendix to this paper, the writer submits a draft of
proposed law suitable for a state which has an existing law and
which lies in two standard time zones. It will be noted that pro-
vision is made for complete articulation with federal regulations,
both as to division points for time change and the shifting of the
time to "save daylight."
VILLIs E. JOHNSON.
ABERDEEN, S. D.
AIPFN DIX*
A Bill
For an Act amending Chapter 46 of the Session Laws of the State
of South Dakota of 1909, Providing for a Standard of Time
in the State of South Dakota.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of South Dakota:
That Chapter 46 of the Session Laws of the State of South
Dakota of 1909, be and the same is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Section 1. That whenever the term "'twelve o'clock" "noon,"
or other designation of time occurs in any legislative bill, reso-
14 Compiled Laws (1897), Vol. 1, Sec. 1753, p. 614 (Act 5. 1885, p. 5).
i5 Commonwealth v. Dougherty, (1909) 39 Pa. Sup, Ct. 338.
*Italics indicate matter not appearing in the present statute. In
1909 a railroad using central time extended into Gregory county. That
railroad now extends into Tripp county also. The Chicago, Milwau-
kee and St. Paul from Chamberlain to Rapid City (west of the Mis-
souri river) since 1909 has adopted Central time. If this time use is
confirmed by the Interstate Commerce Commission it would be an easy
matter for the State Board of Railway Commissioners to adopt a
similar ruling.
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lution or statute; city ordinance or court record; deed, insurance
policy or other contract; or other instrument, record or proceed-
ing; unless otherwise expressly stipulated in writing, the time
understood shall be, for Tripp county and Gregory county and for
portions of the state east of the center of the main channel of
the Missouri river, United States Standard Central Time, or the
mean solar time of ninety degrees west of Greenwich; and for
other portions of the state United States Standard Mountain
Time, or the mean solar time of one hundred five degrees west of
Greenwich.
Section 2. That the State Board of Railway Coimissionrrs
of South Dakota by an order may change the bonmddr between
the standard time belts as provided in Section One of this Act,
having regard for the convenience of commerce and the junction
points and division points of common carriers whose time is or
may be regulated by provisions of Federal laze or by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission acting under authority of Federal
law.
Section 3. That the State Board of Railway Commissioners
of South Dakota may by an order advance or retard the standard
of time as provided in Section One of this Act during certain sea-
sons of the year, having regard for the convenience of the general
public and of common carriers whose standard is or nma, be regu-
lated by Federal law.
Section 4. All Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with this
Act are hereby repealed.
